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What have we Kurds to learn from Israel

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(This article was published long time ago and does not reflect my view of today in regards to the “Palestinian Arabs. I would not know atthe time of writing the strength of Palestinian propaganda and their hatred against Israel).

A lot.

Not that I am one of those Kurds who is “kaafir”. No, I am not muslim. I never was but I also have never been a bad person either. I am of “sersur” origin, which you will know as Alawi or Alevi following the name given by the Kemalist of Turkey in the 20th century, or one might easily associate the belief as one that shares the same roots with the Ezidis and the Ahl-i Haqq. I am not a follower of this belief either. I am rather a non-believer.

What has this to do with Israel and the Kurds? It is about the identity that makes one Kurd, which is what frames this article. It is not about Islam, the Muslims or the Jewish. It is about the Kurds. The Kurdish identity. The identity that unites us.

Israel and its brutality
Rhetoric would ask if we don’t see the brutality of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza? Whether we don’t know the suffering of the Palestinians in general.

I know all these and my heart is with the suffering Palestinians. Truly. Though my honest political opinion on the Israeli – Palestinian conflict is that there should have been a way to find peace between the two societies to settle on the same land peacefully. This hasn’t been the case, and looking at the rhetoric of both sides, no peace is any time soon.

And, no, this small piece of article is not about who is right and who is wrong. As a Kurd, sorry to say, I have no “ideological or humanitarian” particular interest in the rights and wrongs of the world. I prefer to have a politically nationalistic view of the events, be it in the US, Venezuela or Israel – Palestine. When I ask “what have we to learn from Israel” I mean it.

What have we Kurds to learn from Israel?
jew-jitsuRhetoric is one thing that I keep repeating to my friends when it comes to Israel. The Israelis always manage to put things in  a way that is received in the best way possible by the audience. They always put forward the bad actions of their enemies / opponents, make sure that their suffering is repeated by the interviewer, that people know they are not the ones who attacked the first and finally they make sure it is known that their action is for the defense of their people and nothing else. And it is true! They always make sure that their action is in defense.

Us, the Kurds
Let’s have a look at Kurdistan now. A land of about 500’000 km2, as big as France. A Kurdish population of minimum 35 million and to some accounts 50! Where are we in defense of this land and this people? Aren’t we yet only happy about the soon-to-be declared independence of 4.5 million Kurds that are squeezed into about less than 20% of Kurdistan?

What have we Kurds to learn from Israel? First and foremost and with one word: defense. The defense and the whole education system that is behind the Israeli defenses, together with the industrial / technological machine that supports it. Internal strength.

The diplomacy the Israelis develop with each and every strategically important entity on earth, be it a state, a semi-state (like ours or Catalonia) or a corporate structure. The external strength.

A note on Israeli – Palestinian conflict: I don’t like my fellow Kurds taking sides strongly with the IDF because of their dislike of the Arabs, or Anfal contributor Palestinian immigrants of the Saddam Army. And no,  I don’t care what Mr Abbas said against the Kurdish independence. His fault does not lead me to make another fault. Seeing the State of Israel as possible Kurdish allies shall by no accounts  mean that we can not or will not criticize them.


Written by M. Husedin

24 July 2014 at 1:39 PM

The war for Kurdistan and the International Humanitarian Law

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Many articles on Kurds (of Kurds or others) start with a justification of  “why the Kurds have the right to fight; that the Kurdish land has been inherited from their ancestors, that they form a majority on their land and that they are under oppression of regimes that deny their very rights of  ‘being'”.

It is in the recent years that the articles on Kurds changed in nature. More expert articles are produced on various topics. One point, however, is weakly emphasized within the Kurdish and the international community, which is the definition of the war going on in Kurdistan according to International Law and the necessary obligations such a definition brings to the parties engaged in the conflict in Kurdistan.

Two main international conventions set the rules that oblige the state and non-state parties to abide with: Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions. Together with subsequent treaties, case law, and customary international law, these conventions form the International Humanitarian Law (link).

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. (link)

It is mainly due to lack of knowledge of Kurds and lack of institutions to follow the war in Kurdistan, many actions of the oppressive regimes in Kurdistan have gone unseen.

In a war all tactics and stratagems are a part of the ‘game’. The winner and loser are defined by their own terms. Developing diplomacy skills, preparing assaults your opponents are not prepared to, etc. are all part of this game of war. There are actors who oppose wars and there others who define -in their own terms- wars that are ‘justified’. None changes the fact that “there always have been customary practices in war”. Kurds have been one of the most naive nations when it comes to wars.

Modern warfare has brought with it a set of rules that oblige the parties to the warfare to abide with. As mentioned, these set of rules are mainly the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions. There is not a piece of land on earth where parties to a conflict are not obliged by these.

In where International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not apply, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) applies:

Both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) strive to protect the lives, health and dignity of individuals, albeit from a different angle. It is therefore not surprising that, while very different in formulation, the essence of some of the rules is similar, if not identical. For example, the two bodies of law aim to protect human life, prohibit torture or cruel treatment, prescribe basic rights for persons subject to a criminal justice process, prohibit discrimination, comprise provisions for the protection of women and children, regulate aspects of the right to food and health. On the other hand, rules of IHL deal with many issues that are outside the purview of IHRL, such as the conduct of hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status and the protection of the red cross and red crescent emblems. Similarly, IHRL deals with aspects of life in peacetime that are not regulated by IHL, such as freedom of the press, the right to assembly, to vote and to strike. (Link)

Is the Kurdish cause limited to “freedom of press, the right to assembly, to vote and to strike”? Is that the extent of the nature of the war going on in Kurdistan? Of course not and one does not need an expert opinion to see it so. However, lack of expert opinions in case of the war in Kurdistan has been a major faiblesse of the struggle for Kurdistan, Kurdish independence.

Kurds have long suffered and continue to suffer under states that simply do not feel obliged by these rules. In case of Turkey, where according to Geneva Conventions a clear non-international armed conflict (NIAC) continues between the state forces and the PKK, by refusing that there is a conflict, the state simply denies the rights of Prisoners of War (POW) to PKK fighters and many other obligations these conventions bring.

There are hostilities going in all over Kurdistan. Kurdish political parties, mainly PKK today, engage in open armed conflict with states of Turkey, Syria and Iran. In many instances armed troops of the PKK and the states fighting against the PKK visibly organize cross border operations. What is missing is the recognition of this war by the international community.

Not that there are no efforts for this. Perhaps the most important piece of work on this is the one of Kerim Yildiz and Susan Breau: The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict Mechanisms.

This book is a groundbreaking analysis of the on-going conflict waged by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey and its spill over into northern Iraq in terms of the international law of war (jus in bello or international humanitarian law) and the use of force (jus ad bellum).

their analysis is divide
d into two parts. Part I concerns the international law of armed conflict as applied to the Kurdish struggle, while Part II delves into some potential legal and political solutions. Upon analyzing the relevant literature and treaties, the opening chapter of Part I concludes “on a factual basis in spite of the denial of Turkey” (p. 58) that the complex conflict in southeast Turkey, which also spills over into northern Iraq, constitutes a non-international armed conflict. Thus, “it can be argued that a whole range of humanitarian guarantees are offered to both civilians and combatants” (p. 88) by such means as the Hague Regulations of 1907 as well as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 with their Common Article 3 that provides limited protections for civilians and members of armed forces hors de combat. (link)

Based on ordinary knowledge of the mentioned conventions, the aim of this article is to:

  1. Bringing to the attention of Kurdish political organizations the fact that their fighters have more rights according to the mentioned conventions; that the states they are engaged in war / conflict have certain clear obligations that are not respected.
  2. Inviting the international community, (mainly the ICRC, the organization which, by the Geneva Conventions, mandated) to ensure that the states engaged in hostilities with well organized Kurdish military organizations to respect the mentioned laws. (ICRC’s hypocrisy in not mentioning the hostility between the Turkish State and the PKK in Iraqi soils is worth mentioning in bold (link))

Following are taken from a study published on the ICRC’s website, titled “The protective scope of  Common Article 3: more than meets the eye”, written by Jelena Pejic (link).

(The bolds and italics are of mine)

it is widely accepted that non-international armed conflicts governed by Common Article 3 are those waged between state armed forces and non-state armed groups or between such groups themselves. IHL treaty law allows a distinction to be made between NIACs within the meaning of Common Article 3 and those meeting the higher, Additional Protocol II, threshold.

At least two criteria are considered indispensable for classifying a situation of violence as a Common Article 3 armed conflict, thus distinguishing it from internal disturbances or tensions that remain below the threshold.

The first is the existence of parties to the conflict. Common Article 3 expressly refers to ‘each Party to the conflict’, thereby implying that a precondition for its application is the existence of at least two ‘parties’. While it is usually not difficult to establish whether a state party exists, determining whether a non-state armed group may be said to constitute a ‘party’ for the purposes of Common Article 3 can be complicated, mainly because of lack of clarity as to the precise facts and, on occasion, because of the political unwillingness of governments to acknowledge that they are involved in a NIAC. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that a non-state party to a NIAC means an armed group with a certain level of organization that would essentially enable it to implement international humanitarian law.International jurisprudence has developed indicative factors on the basis of which the ‘organization’ criterion may be assessed. They include the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the armed group; the existence of headquarters; the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms; the group’s ability to plan, co-ordinate, and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords; and so forth.Put differently, even if the level of violence in a given situation is very high (in a situation of mass riots, for example), unless there is an organized armed group on the other side, one cannot speak of a non-international armed conflict.

The second criterion commonly used to determine the existence of a Common Article 3 armed conflict is the intensity of the violence involved. This is also a factual criterion, the assessment of which depends on an examination of events on the ground. Pursuant to international jurisprudence, indicative factors for assessment include:

the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons and other military equipment used, the number and calibre of munitions fired, the number of persons and types of forces partaking in the fighting, the number of casualties, the extent of material destruction, and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.

certain NIACs originating within the territory of a single state between government armed forces and one or more organized armed groups have also been known to ‘spill over’ into the territory of neighbouring states. Leaving aside other legal issues that may be raised by the incursion of foreign armed forces into neighbouring territory (violations of sovereignty and possible reactions of the armed forces of the adjacent state that could turn the fighting into an international armed conflict), it is submitted that the relations between parties whose conflict has spilled over remain at a minimum governed by Common Article 3 and customary IHL. This position is based on the understanding that the spill over of a non-international armed conflict into adjacent territory cannot have the effect of absolving the parties of their IHL obligations simply because an international border has been crossed. The ensuing legal vacuum would deprive of protection both civilians potentially affected by the fighting and persons who fall into enemy hands.

It is ironic that the ICRC can define what very well suits the conflict going on between Turkey, Iran, Syria and the PKK but not find it worth even being mentioned.

Is there more than that meets the eye?

Written by M. Husedin

29 September 2012 at 11:28 AM

Kurdistan is all about geostrategy

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I have come accross a 1920 issue of the NYT, thanks to @RozhBar, here is the link to read the article.

What I would like to point out is that. Whenever there has been a discussion about Kurdistan, it has always been about its geostrategy, be it in relation to India for the British, or the Mediterranean for the Russians, or today the Caspian and Central Asia for the Americans.

If once the Kurds themselves can understand this simple fact about their land, then they can pick one global ally (my nominee to be the winner is the US) and finally get the support and recognition. The support and recognition the Kurds so very desperately long to understand why they do not get.

Written by M. Husedin

25 February 2012 at 12:14 AM

Attack to Syria: opening the Kurdish corridor for an attack to Iran

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The term logistics -in the sense being used today- was most probably first used after the World War II in American army (1953). It is also said that the term logistics comes from the surname of a general in Napoleon’s army who was responsible -and also effective- in provisioning the army with supplies, and that his surname has become the word for logistics today (logistique). Whether one or the other, it is clear that military warfare and logistics are very closely related.

When following events and developing analysis, I am being careful about ground preparations of an eventual assault, which I believe has not changed much since the times of Sun Tzu, the author of famous Art of War.

Whatever happens between nations, states, peoples; it is all about who is ready for what. Military preparation is almost always to avoid an actual war by showing the opponent that you are ready for it. Readiness is the key word here. Military logistics (and logistics in general) is all about being ready. When the shit hits the fan you want to be ready. This is almost all about it.

Then, there are times when you can not avoid a war. This is when the war happens.  Any general will always want to make sure that the right troops with all their arms, vehicles and provisions are at the right place, at the right time.

Now, put yourself to an American general’s shoes who is responsible for preparing the army for a war in Iran and think where you would want your army to be positioned and what access routes you would want to be secured:

I will not go into any detail in this article other than this small note here to tell that such a political map is no help to any general for preparing on the ground for an assault against Iran. I will only mention so briefly that Turkmenistan and Armenia are with Russia, thus no enemies to Iran; Azerbaijan and Georgia are with USA and Israel, thus friends with USA. Afghanistan and until recently Iraq under American invasion, whereas Pakistan and Turkey, though allies to USA, are against an attack to Iran (and sometimes openly declaring support for it). And of course the neighboring Arab states on the other side of the Persian Gulf are all pro-American. 

If I was the imaginary American general, I would make sure that I had access to the war theatre both from Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, through Hormuz Strait. For both passages, you need to secure and gain support of two nations which are not shown on this map: the Kurds and the Balloch.

However, the above map itself is a misperception for not showing the two nations who are hostile to Iranian regime. The Kurds in the west and the Balloch in the East.  Let’s examine the demography maps of these peoples / nations in relation to Iran’s borders.

First, map of Kurdistan. See what actually the western border of Iran looks like:
In this demographic map you see that the Persians have no borders with the Turks. It is all Kurds, it is all Kurdistan.

Now, have a look at the Baluchistan map on the other side, in the east:
Iran has no border with Pakistan, and if you include the Pashto, Iran has almost no border with Afghanistan. Both the Balloch and the Pashto carry hostile feelings against the Persians. Just like Kurds.

I guess this much introduction is enough to understand that what is seen in a ‘normal’ political map is completely wrong on the ground. A general will calculate well these variables before marching into these territories.

These are all well said and now we can continue with the analysis of the western front of a war against Iran, which is basically Kurdistan as you have seen.


Iran’s western border is basically Kurdistan.It can be said that south of Kurdistan are the Shia Arabs of Iraq. Right, and they owe their rule in Baghdad to Americans. Not much to write on this, as against all the commentators I do not believe the Shia Arab politicians can possibly have negative feelings against the Americans, or that they will go out of control.

Iran’s western border is Kurdistan. There is part of Kurdistan under Persian rule, which we call Eastern Kurdistan. In this article we analyze the parts of Kurdistan which are not under Persian rule.

North of Iran’s western border is Northern Kurdistan, Kurdistan under Turkish rule, and south of it is South Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan, which is semi-independent and if the rumours have truth, they are preparing for a declaration of independence. South Kurdistan, without doubt, is ally to the USA. Since the security of South Kurdistan is still widely owed to the US protection umbrella, I exclude an option that they do not fully support US in a war against Iran. Current Kurdish president Massoud Barzani’s father was Chief of Army of short lived Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad of Eastern Kurdistan, which was crashed brutally by the Persians. Long story but enough to know and imagine that president Barzani will want to liberate hs brothers and sisters accross the border.

This is one at hand for the American general.

One in hand but still too far to Mediterranean.

Can we expect the Turks to allow American troops and their provisions to pass freely through Turkey. Well, Turks refused a similar request in 2003 when Americans asked 61’500 trrops permanently based + 61’500 troops in transit during the war against Saddam to fight in what woould have been the Northern front. Turks refused and it did not happen. There is no reason for the Turks to accept a similar request in the coming years.  Actually, there are already reports leaking out that Turks do not want to allow any foreigners in Turkey during a war against Syria:

Meanwhile, there have been disagreements regarding what action must be taken against Syria. Turkey refuses to set up buffer zones for civilians on its border with Syria, and demands that the transfer of equipment and medicine be done via the sea and not through its territory.

Fortunately, Kurdistan map does not end in South Kurdistan. We still have the Southwest Kurdistan, what is Kurdish region under Syrian rule (Good news for our imaginary American general):

Syrian Kurdistan or Southwest Kurdistan itself does not border Mediterranean, which is not very important in my opinion. The lost connection of Kurdistan to Mediterranean is due to Turkification and de-Kurdification policy of the Turkish state. It can be reversed in time. This remark is for the Kurds themselves.

As for the Americans; once invaded, Latakia may very well serve as the port. Or, better still, Iskenderun under Turkish rule, once bordering Kurdistan, can serve this purpose. New Syrian state under American rule may sign a quick free-customs-trade-agreement and that may allow Iskenderun port to be a future base for US military supplies.

Once such a route is opened, it may very well serve the Kurds to open to the world.

Expect more on this to pop up in the future articles.

Written by M. Husedin

19 February 2012 at 8:50 PM

South Kurdistan finally under security umbrella

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Northern Iraq as they call it, or Free Kurdistan as many Kurdish intellectuals enjoy to name. Simply South Kurdistan for Kurds in general.

This geographical naming comes from 1946 dated, short lived Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad (part of Kurdistan under Persian rule in Iran today). The rest of Kurdistan named after Republic’s capital’s geographical location started being taken as the center. The part of Kurdistan under Turkish occupation is thus the North, Northern Iraq the South and the rest under Persian rule in Iran the East. For having been relatively small compared to others, the Syrian occupied part is called the Southwest.

In 1991, after one of the many massacres, when 1.5 million fled to Northern Kurdistan from Saddam’s armies and chemical bombs, the USA and its NATO allies declared a no-fly zone in the North of Iraq, in South Kurdistan with Operation Steel Curtain. This safe heaven led to the establishment of a joint Kurdish parliament in Hawlar (Arbil) of two main Kurdish factions in South Kurdistan: Hawlar based, Masoud Barzani led Partiya Demokratika Kurdistan, PDK (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and Sulaymaniyah based, Jalal Talabani led Yekitiya Netewiya Kurdistan, YNK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).

Although there has been a terrible bloodshed between the two factions short after the establishment of the parliament, it survived under the protection of American army, based in Incirlik in south of Turkey (of ancient Cilicia of long lost Armenians).

In 2003, with the American led invasion of Iraq and end to Saddam’s rule in the country, Kurds registered their state in the new Iraqi constitution as a federate state. This has been the only single strategical achievement of 40 million or so Kurds in modern times. However, achievements on paper do not mean much in the Middle East…

In the Middle East borders are fake, so are the countries and states these borders draw. So are the constitutions and the laws. So fake are the nations of Syria, Iran, Turkey, Iraq… These state-nations are strong however, and Kurds are not. The tiny little oil rich Free Kurdistan is thus basically free when there is American protection to it. Not free otherwise and an open target to the Turks and Persians.

I have naturally been worried about the faith of my ‘free Kurdistan’ which I could never visit. Strategical, yes, but very fragile. What I had as hope was that the American led West would not leave Kurdistan behind to the bloody handed Turks, Persians or Arabs.

One option was that the Americans would keep a number of troops in South Kurdistan. I do not have such info but I also do not believe the Americans do not actually keep a certain number. Just in case. Iran is next door. Or the Israelis, for their own sake. But neither could go so far as to scare the Turks. Kurdish ruled united / unpartitioned Kurdistan is the only single strategical threat to the Turks.

What other option would then be to reassure the Kurds like me? The news is as follows:

Tony Hayward moves into Kurdistan with Genel Energy as tensions rise

 Vallares, Tony Hayward and Nathaniel Rothschild’s oil investment vehicle, will issue its Genel prospectus at lunchtime on Friday – three days sooner than expected.

The semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) inked a deal with Exxon Mobil last week – before a deal on revenues sharing has been agreed with the Iraqi central government. Vallares has insisted that its agreements with the KRG over Taq Taq and other blocks in the region were still valid.
J. Rockefeller and G. Rotchschild

The significance of this news is that both Rockefeller and Rothschild families have faith in Kurdistan and its future that they invest there (or they want Kurdistan to be there for their very own plans). Rothschilds putting in 2 billion dollars for their investment. Rockefellers doing their investment directly with their Admiral ship Exxon-Mobil and signing contract for six areas with Kurdistan Reginal Government (KRG) of which three are -according to Iraqi constitution- not even under KRG rule, however in practice and claim.

Article 140 of the Interim Iraqi Constitution states that the faith of Disputed Areas, created by Saddam’s Arabization program and separated constitutionally from the rest of South Kurdistan, the Kurdish areas, i.e. Kurdish city of Kirkuk, will be decided by a referendum.

On eKurd website there is a more in depth analysis on this same news I am commenting and can be read on this link.

The rest of the news are details for me. What is important is that South Kurdistan is under protection umbrella and will survive and will prosper and will continue giving hope to the rest Kurds; the world’s biggest nationality without a state of their own, under suppression of Turks of Turkey, Persians of Iran and Arabs of Syria. No more the Arabs of Iraq. Over!

Written by M. Husedin

22 December 2011 at 11:52 AM

Putin’s Eurasian Union, The USA and the future for Kurdistan

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It is only few weeks since I published the article titled “Is there a future for Kurdistan with Russia?” Below quote is from the mentioned article:

One thing however is for sure, and it is that Russia’s leadership must show its citizens that it is once again a reputed global power. This will require to show some muscle here and there. And this is not good news for Kurdistan.

Not long has passed and Putin wrote an article on his new Eurasian Union project. This is basically Russia reclaiming whatever it can from the ex-Soviet soil, which was the soil of tsar era before the World War I age. Short, Russia follows the same strategy map, still after what the tsars were after.

Here I would like you to read the third chapter (The Partition of Asiatic Turkey) of the book Secret Treaties and Understandings, prepared and published by F. Seymour Cocks, long long ago. You can read the book from this link.

If you have read;

In short in this book, ancient Cilicia and Western Kurdistan was given to the French and rest of the Kurdistan to Russia. If we look at today’s maps, we see that this partitioning of Kurdistan between the French and the Russians is what did not happen at the end of the World War I. Thsu, we can speculate on the interests of these three and their agreement on the borders they agreed upon if things did not go wrong.

* Was what is Eastern Kurdistan in Iran today (Kermanshah, Urmiyah, Sine, etc) left to Russians is kind of unclear in this partitioning. Which power was going to take this part? Or, was it another agreement between the same powers on partitioning of Iran?

The question is not why they had interest in the land of other peoples, that would be stupid, but rather who asked which land and why. Why Russia took only the north of Kurdistan and not further south all the way to the mediterranean. Why did the French took only western Kurdistan and not further north all the way to Azerbaidjan.

Here is what these powers agreed to take from Kurdistan and its periphery with Kurdish political description and geographical naming of the land, which is also clearly the terminology of those partitioners;

  • The French takes western Kurdistan and Adana. Ottoman province of Mossul, an arab city remains with them as well, however Kurdish city of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniah, Hewler and Dohuk is kind of unclear on the partitioning map. Should have been left to Russia because these lands were left to Britain’s mandate, which later became Iraq today. *
  • Russia takes the rest of Kurdistan all the way down to Botan (should include Siirt and around in Kurdistan today, Botan region of Kurdistan) *
  • The British takes central and south of Iraq today.
  • Port of Alexandretta, Iskenderun today remains a neutral port, not pointed out well in this map.

Now, why Alexandretta, Iskenderun is an important point to be mentioned and agreed upon on such a big partitioning? As a Kurdish geostrategy writer my answer is that it is the gateway to Kurdistan and it is Kurdistan’s gateway to the world. Moreover, Kurdistan itself is a gateway Central Asia if thought together with Azerbaidjan.

It is clear that the agreement on such partitioning between these three powers, the one including Alexandretta (of which was named Hatay and annexed to Turkey in 1939):

  1. there was a special interest in Kurdistan, and more importantly:
  2. noone could get Kurdistan in unity

In the same agreement between the Russians and the west (French and British), it is agreed that Russia would get the control of Constantinople, Istanbul today. In short, northern and central Kurdistans to the Russians, its west to the French. It is mentioned in the same agreement that Russia would get Constantinople or Istanbul.

One should have a look at this grand Russia picture and see that Russia would control the access to / from Black Sea and none of the western powers would have access to Central Asia. Central Asia, which is in the center of the map for Putin’s Eurasia Union.

The west has changed in power balance since then. After the Bolshevik revolution Lenin gave up all the claims of tsarist Russia on Kurdistan. The west, namely the French gave up claims on western Kurdistan and Adana.Everything, later on including Alexandretta (Iskenderun) was given to Turkey. It was just Mossul and its Kurdish territories that was later decided by the League of Nations under British hegemony to be left under the British mandate, which has become Iraq. Kurds were clearly to get nothing under the British mandate or Iraq until the US intervened there with the first and second gulf wars.

Thus created modern day Turkey, republic of the Turks and enemy of the Kurds.

Turkey seems to be the lock on an unrealized deal on Kurdistan between Russia and the west. The west agreed on partitioning of the Ottoman land but Lenin spoilt everything.

It is most probably that Lenin’s Russia and the direction this communicst state would take was not known that the west agreed on the sealing of an unrealized geopartitioning deal: the grave Kurdistan and the Kurds burried in to.

It was in 1921 when Lenin agreed with the Turks and ‘secured’ ‘revolution’s border there. Such a shame on Lenin knowingly burrying Kurds for the sake of his revolution and an ideology. Such a pragmatism he himself loved to criticize in his famous polemics.

Then, Soviets collapsed, then Russia started losing in from its Soviet time geographical dominancy with Yeltsin and then Putin rose to power to put and end to the retreat. Now Putin comes back only to reclaim Central Asia. He can not yet imagine of more than this without doing more at home.

What interests the Kurds in this is not what Russia is interested in, not that Russia has interest in Kurdistan. No, not today. It is rather if the USA will stop its interest for Central Asia. Kurdistan would be meaningful for the US only in such a scenario.

There will be more on this in future articles.

Written by M. Husedin

24 October 2011 at 3:07 PM

The US and the Middle East | The Turks and the Kurds

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Erdogan announced proudly to his nation: they were going to receive predators from US to use in their fight against the Kurds.

Erdogan is either over excited about this issue or he is openly manipuating it. The predators, according to the news, are going to be based in Incirlik, where Turks virtually have no control on.

Are they really going to be given to the Turks, then? Stop joking.

Are they going to be based in Incirlik for Turkey’s fight against the Kurdish insurgency against Turkish racism? Well, this is already continuing besides the shame scores US continues receiving.

Israel was receiving the shame scores until recently with their UAVs navigating over Kurdistan to aid the Turks in their Kurdish guerilla hunt. Not that the Israelis remembered their own oppression history and decided to stop taking sides with the likes of the Nazis. No, unfortunately this is not the case behind. It was a crisis Turkey created, not Israel, that yielded Israel to stop providing its UAVs to the Turks. We can only hope today about Israel, that one day the Israeli will remember that sometimes the societies need universal values and principles in statebeing rather than real-politic alone.

Turks are far from such values. Look at what’s going on about the Kurds in Turkey. Kurdish is forbidden to be used in education, yet it is the language of 40 million only in the Middle East, and the demand for Kurdish identity is still welcomed in Turkish prisons. And what an identity; of about twenty million Kurds in Turkey alone. This Turkey is an ally of the West. An example democracy for the Middle East. More shame scores for the west..

It is clear that US does not give any predators’ control to any Turks. First of all, technically speaking, these aircrafts are piloted by who-knows-who guys located somewhere known to noone. Secondly, I do not believe the Kurdish guerillas who pose no threat at all to the US or its interests in the Middle East will be attacked by the US by its most advanced and one of the most expensive war machines. For sure, they will continue their air controls over Iraqi territory from their new location after leaving Iraqi soil, and for sure they will continue giving the same service to Turkey which they have been giving. The way I see this news is relocating the predators close to Syrian soil, basically a half an hour flight.

As followers of this blog will know, I am of the opinion that a rapid logistical prepositioning and ally making of the US against Syria is ongoing. Turks have assumed the main role happily, since last thing they want to see in any part of Kurdistan is another KRG like entity, Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. With fresh memories of how the US can punish after they rejected to ally with the US for the invasion of Iraq, they are more than willing to be with the US in Syria. They blame themselves for the KRG establishment. They are of the opinion that they could prevent the KRG if they took sides with the US and invade Iraq together.

This is how the Turks opened their doors to Syrian opposition to have their meetings and organize themselves. As for the Kurds, since they are received in hostility by the Turks and likewise by the Syrian Arabs, they are discussing to form their own alliance in what is Southwest Kurdistan. In their distrust to the Arabs they demand an autonomy or a federation of their own. Just like KRG!

How much will the Arabs welcome the Turks in Syria, we do not know. As the saying goes in Turkish, ‘that who falls to the sea, hugs the snake in despair’. The Syrian Arabs may be accepting the Turkish hand for the moment, however, I do not believe they will accept the Turks as their rescuers. Arab politicians may not be the most intelligent on Earth, but at the same time I do not believe they can be that stupid to trust to Turkey after the centuries long Ottoman experience.

As for the Kurds, they do not trust the Turks as they do not trust the Arabs. This is globally known. What will the strategy of the US in Syria be then? Going in with the Turks? Ignoring the Kurds in Syria’s north and allowing the Turks to go into a fight with the Kurds there as well?

Ignoring the Kurds in Syria’s north and allowing the Turks to oppress the Kurds there can not really be called a policy, can it?

US will eventually contact the Kurds. Since the change of status quo in the Middle East scares the Turks more than anyone else (it gives hope to the Kurds to end the denial they have been facing), US must be approaching to the Turks tactically to convince them that US interests in the region are not against those of the Turks.This is what I believe. This is what the Americans did in Iraq’s north.

Time will show if I am right, but meanwhile the Kurds will follow what proved to be the best Kurdish saying: ‘no friends but mountains’, until the tide turns.

Written by M. Husedin

04 October 2011 at 9:04 PM